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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
For class action practitioners, 2007 was an eventful year in the
Eleventh Circuit, marked by important doctrinal shifts in areas thought
to be settled and a reprise of an old favorite. The year also included
three decisions in collective action employment cases, reflecting the
surge in employment class actions in recent years.
I. LOWERY V. ALABAMA POWER Co.
In probably its most controversial class action decision of 2007, Lowery
v. Alabama Power Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's
remand of a toxic tort mass action originally filed in Alabama state
court, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). 2 In Lowery
the court announced new ground rules for determining the amount in
controversy in all diversity cases, rules tending to make removal more
difficult whenever the plaintiff opposes it.3 As the court summarized its
holding:
We think it highly questionable whether a defendant could ever file a
notice of removal on diversity grounds in a case such as the one before
us-where the defendant, the party with the burden of proof, has only
bare pleadings containing unspecified damages on which to base its
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2. Id. at 1212; Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28
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Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 n.63.
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notice-without seriously testing the limits of compliance with Rule
11.4
Lowery was originally brought in Alabama state court, before CAFA's
effective date, by 9 plaintiffs against 12 corporations and 120 fictitious
entities. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants had discharged particulates and gases into the atmosphere and ground water, and the plaintiffs
sought damages for personal injuries and loss of the use and enjoyment
of their property, as well as punitive damages. The original complaint
also included a per-plaintiff demand for compensatory and punitive
damages of $1,250,000 each.5
The plaintiffs amended their complaint three times in state court, each
time asserting the same substantive claims and ultimately demanding
unspecified compensatory and punitive damages in excess of the state
court's jurisdictional limit. They also added roughly 400 plaintiffs as
well as additional defendants, including Alabama Power Company.
Alabama Power, added as a defendant after CAFA's effective date,
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern
6
District of Alabama as a "mass action" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, asserting (among other things)
that Alabama Power had not met its burden of proof to establish federal
jurisdiction under CAFA. In response, Alabama Power filed a supplement to its notice of removal, pointing out that there were more than
400 plaintiffs whose claims would need to yield only $12,500 each to
reach $5,000,000 and that plaintiffs in recent Alabama mass toxic tort
cases had received either jury verdicts or settlements in excess of
$5,000,000.
Alabama Power also filed a motion to serve limited
jurisdictional discovery in the event there was a question about the
presence of the requisite amount in controversy. The district court,
however, granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand.'
Alabama Power appealed the remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c)(1).' Before turning to the question of whether the case was
properly remanded for lack of the requisite amount in controversy, the
Eleventh Circuit addressed two preliminary questions.9 First, the court
held that Alabama Power's notice of removal effected the removal of the
claims against other defendants, including defendants who had been
made parties to the action before CAFA's effective date: "[Riemoval

4. Id.
5. Id. at 1187-88.
6. Id. at 1188; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (Supp. V 2005).
7. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1189-91.
8. Id. at 1192; 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
9. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1195-96, 1205.
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under the statute encompasses all the claims in the 'action' as a whole,
not simply the claims against a removing defendant." ° Second, the
court clarified that CAFA's definition of "mass action" requires, with
respect to the amount in controversy, only that $5,000,000 be at stake
in the action; it does not impose an additional requirement that each
plaintiff in the mass action have a $75,000 claim, as the district court
had found."
The court began its evaluation of the amount in controversy by
reiterating the rule that the removing defendant has the burden of proof
in establishing the amount in controversy and that "in the removal
context where damages are unspecified, the removing party bears the
burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of
the evidence."1 2 While acknowledging "the peculiar implications of
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard ... [to] naked

pleadings," the court held that it was bound to adhere to its prior
decisions adopting the standard. 3 Quickly following that nod to
precedent, however, was the court's admonition that "any attempt to
engage in a preponderance of the evidence assessment at this juncture
would necessarily amount to unabashed guesswork, and such speculation
is frowned upon."' 4
Against that backdrop, the court held that the "scope of evidence" to
be considered by a court assessing the propriety of removal is limited to
the "removing documents," which necessarily include at least one
document from each party: the defendant's notice of removal and
whatever document the defendant received from the plaintiff that led the
defendant to conclude that the case was removable. 5 In a footnote, the
court noted an exception to this limitation for situations in which
damages arise "from a source such as a contract provision," in which
case the defendant might also attach the contract to its notice of removal
"whether or not the defendant received the contract from the plaintiff."6 A defendant's hope of establishing the jurisdictional amount in
a breach of contract action by reference to the contract, however, may be
limited to cases in which the relevant potential damages figure is

10.
11.

Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1205.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1208-09.
1209-10.
1211.
1211-13 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b), 1447(c) (2000)).
1214 n.66.
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liquidated
or otherwise discernible, without dispute, from the contract
17
itself.
Next, the court held that despite its prior reference to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the removing documents themselves must
"unambiguously establish" the existence of federal jurisdiction." The
court also foreclosed any post-removal jurisdictional discovery:
Post-removal discovery disrupts the careful assignment of burdens
and the delicate balance struck by the underlying rules. A district
court should not insert itself into the fray by granting leave for the
defendant to conduct discovery or by engaging in its own discovery.
Doing so impermissibly lightens the defendant's burden of establishing
jurisdiction. A court should not participate in a one-sided subversion
of the rules. The proper course is remand.19
Applying this framework, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the remand
order.20
The original complaint-with its $1,250,000 per-plaintiff
demand-did not unambiguously establish jurisdiction because it had
been superseded by the later amended complaints. 2 And the operative
complaint, which substituted a nonspecific demand for the $1,250,000
figure, did not establish jurisdiction, according to the court, because the
revision to the demand necessarily indicated a revision of the plaintiffs'
good-faith estimation of the amount at issue.22 Evidence of results in
other cases also did not support removal because the evidence was "not
received from the plaintiffs" and told the court "nothing about the value
of the claims in this lawsuit."2 3 Moreover, Alabama Power's common
sense argument that each of the 400 plaintiffs would need only $12,500
at stake for the mass action to meet the $5,000,000 threshold would
require "impermissible speculation-evaluating without the benefit of
any evidence the value of individual claims."24
The court in Lowery held that for a diversity case to be successfully
removed to federal court, the removing documents, including some
document (likely the complaint) "received from the plaintiff," must

17. See id. ("When a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages and does not make a specific
demand, therefore, the factual information establishing the jurisdictional amount must
come from the plaintiff.").
18. Id. at 1213.
19. Id. at 1218 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 1221.
21. See id. at 1219.
22. Id. at 1220.
23. Id. at 1221.
24. Id. at 1220.
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unambiguously establish jurisdiction.25 Can this standard be met, at
least in tort cases, absent a concession from the plaintiff that the
requisite amount is at stake? The court's remand in Lowery illustrates
that in the case of dueling allegations concerning the amount in
controversy, the defendant-as the party with the burden of proof-faces
long odds.
Three of the holdings in Lowery warrant closer examination. First,
the court reasoned that the standard for ascertaining that a case has
become removable-the triggering event for second-chance, thirty-day
removal window under the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 26is the only permissible standard for assessing removability." The court
cited two cases discussing the second paragraph of § 1446(b),2" the
paragraph that applies "[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable."29 Both cases, Bosky v. Kroger Texas, LP,"° and Huffman
v. Saul Holdings, LP,3" concerned challenges to the timeliness of
removal after the receipt of a post-complaint "other document."32 Both
held that under the second paragraph of § 1446(b), some "unequivocal"
indication of removability must be present before removability becomes
ascertainable, 33 and it is at that time that the defendant's thirty-day

25.
26.

Id. at 1213 & n.63, 1221.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). Section 1446(b) provides the following:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the
defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required
to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.

Id.
27. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 & n.63 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).
28. Id. at 1213 n.63.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
30. 288 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2002).
31. 194 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 1999).
32. See Bosky, 288 F.3d at 209; Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1076.
33. Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1078 ("'If the statute is going to run, the notice ought to be
unequivocal.'" (quoting DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480, 489 (10th Cir. 1979)));
Bosky, 288 F.3d at 211 (quoting this portion of Huffman).
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clock begins to run.34 But the court in Lowery adopted the standard
enunciated in Bosky and Huffman to circumscribe the universe of
evidence to be considered in assessing federal jurisdiction."5 Thus,
under Lowery, the requirement in § 1446(b) for the timeliness of removal,
as construed in cases like Bosky and Huffman, supplies the unambiguous establishment requirement for the propriety of removal.3 6 The
distinction is real; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Bosky stated explicitly that its requirement of an unequivocal
demonstration of removability was unique to the second paragraph of
§ 1446(b). 7 The Fifth Circuit also clarified that its holding with
respect to the thirty-day time limit for removability did not change the
substantive standard for removability:
Nor do we believe the standard we adopt today conflicts with our
cases holding that a defendant can still show a case to be removable on
the basis of a state court complaint which does not explicitly state a
demand for damages exceeding the threshold amount in controversy.
Those holdings are not relevant here because the timeliness requirement of the second paragraph of section 1446(b) does not play unless
"the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable." 8
Under Lowery, however, a case apparently cannot be removed unless and
until the "ascertainability" standard is met.
Second, the court in Lowery also used Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure
11" ("Alabama Rule 11") to support its holding, discussing the rule's
application to both a plaintiff's complaint and a defendant's notice of
removal.4 ° With respect to the plaintiffs' complaint in Lowery, the
court rejected Alabama Power's argument that the plaintiffs' third

34. See Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1078; Bosky, 288 F.3d at 211.
35. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 n.63, 1213-14.
36. Id. at 1213 (citing § 1446(b) as providing the standard for "assessing the propriety
of removal").
37. 288 F.3d at 211. The Fifth Circuit explained:
"Setting forth," the key language of the first paragraph [of § 1446(b)], encompasses
a broader range of information that can trigger a time limit based on notice than
would "ascertained," the pivotal term in the second paragraph. To "set forth"
means to "publish" or "to give an account or statement of." "Ascertain" means "to
make certain, exact, or precise" or "to find out or learn with certainty." The latter,
in contrast to the former, seems to require a greater level of certainty or that the
facts supporting removability be stated unequivocally.
1d. (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted) (quoting Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160,
161 (5th Cir. 1992)).
39. ALA. R. Civ. P. 11.
40. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1220.
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amended complaint could be read consistently with their earlier
$1,250,000 per-plaintiff demand for the same claims, which would have
satisfied the amount in controversy requirement.4 ' The court reasoned
that the two complaints could not be read consistently-that is, the third
amended complaint could not be read as merely a less detailed version
of the first-because the plaintiffs, mindful of Alabama Rule 11, must
The unstated
have substantively revalued the damages at stake.
premise is that Alabama Rule 11, which tracks the prior version of the
federal rule, somehow requires not only that a plaintiff's allegations have
a good-faith basis but also that a plaintiff affirmatively include in his or
her complaint the most precise damages demand that is consistent with
the good-faith standard.
With respect to a removing defendant, the court in Lowery reinforced
its holding that the removing documents must unequivocally establish
1143
jurisdiction by suggesting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
("Federal Rule 11") already required as much:
Indeed, the defendant, by removing the action, has represented to the
court that the case belongs before it. Having made this representation,
the defendant is no less subject to [Federal] Rule 11 than a plaintiff
who files a claim originally. Thus, a defendant that files a notice of
removal prior to receiving clear evidence that the action satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements, and then later faces a motion to remand,
is in the same position as a plaintiff in an original action facing a
motion to dismiss ....
The defendants' request for discovery is tantamount to an
....
admission that the defendants do not have a factual basis for believing
that jurisdiction exists.'
But Federal Rule 11 requires only that factual allegations "have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery," not that the allegations be supported by "clear
evidence" when the notice of removal is filed.45
Third, the court in Lowery paired its requirement that the removing
documents themselves unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction if the
case is to stay in federal court with a prohibition on jurisdictional

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 1219-20.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
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discovery in federal court.48 The origins of the court's bar on jurisdictional discovery are inscrutable. The court referred to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8(a)4 7 and 11 in support of its holding s but cited no
precedent for a prohibition on jurisdictional discovery after removal, and
there is precedent to the contrary.49 The absolute bar on discovery
conflicts with the unmistakable emphasis of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and accompanying jurisdictional statutes on reaching the
merits of an issue rather than relying on earlier code-pleading wordsmithing of pleadings. The court's refusal to engage in what it termed
"speculation" concerning the jurisdictional amount seems to be an
entirely contrived dilemma. Limited jurisdictional discovery would allow
the court to resolve jurisdictional facts and still avoid resorting to
guesswork. The court even acknowledged that "post-removal jurisdictional discovery may appear to present a viable option for a court
examining its jurisdiction," but it still concluded that "[s]ound policy and
notions of judicial economy and fairness ... dictate that we not follow
this course." 0 The court seemed to rest its fairness assessment on a
hypothetical diversity case in which a plaintiff filed a complaint that the
defendant challenged for lack of jurisdiction:
Despite the plaintiff's representation and our assumption of good
faith, if a material element required for either the substantive claim or
the court's subject matter jurisdiction is missing from the complaint,
the defendant may move to dismiss. If the plaintiff's counsel concedes
that the plaintiff lacks the evidence necessary to cure the deficiency,
the court may dismiss the action for failure to state a claim or want of
jurisdiction. In either case, without further discovery, counsel cannot
in good faith amend the complaint to provide the missing element. In
our hypothetical diversity case, should the plaintiff request leave to
conduct discovery to support its assertionthat the case is properly before

the court, the court would deny such a request. In such a situation, the

46. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1221.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
48. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1217 & n.74.
49. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978)
("[W]here issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the
facts bearing on such issues."); Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901,
903 (11th Cir. 1984). In Majd-Pour the court held that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without first
allowing discovery in support of the plaintiffs claimed jurisdictional bases, including
diversity. Id. The court stated, "[Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to discover facts that
would support his allegations of jurisdiction." Id.; see also 6 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.41[11][a] (3d ed. 2007).
50. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1216.
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court would not reserve ruling on the motion to dismiss in order to
allow the plaintiff to look for what the plaintiff should have had-but
did not-before coming through the courthouse doors, even though the
court would have the inherent power to do so. In deciding if dismissal
is proper, a court would look only to the facts as alleged in the
complaint and would not waste limited judicial resources by directing
its inquiry elsewhere." 1
Reinforcing the point, the court asserted that to allow a removing
defendant jurisdictional discovery would be to "impermissibly lighten[]
the defendant's burden of establishing jurisdiction," which would amount
to a "one-sided subversion of the rules" by the district court.5 2
The problem with the court's analogy to a plaintiff facing a motion to
dismiss is the conflation of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A
plaintiff facing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
arguably would have to produce evidence to avoid dismissal. However,
contrary to the suggestion in Lowery, the plaintiff generally would be
allowed some jurisdictional discovery, at least where the jurisdictional
facts challenged by the defendant were entirely within the defendant's
knowledge, such as the facts concerning the defendant's citizenship.
A plaintiff facing a motion to dismiss may not be allowed discovery to
cure deficiencies in his complaint, but he would not be required to
produce evidence to withstand the motion. All that is required are
allegations consistent with Rule 11 and any other applicable pleading
standard, even the most stringent of which does not require production
of evidence-much less unambiguous evidence-at the pleadings
stage.53 By treating the two kinds of motions to dismiss together, the
court in Lowery suggested that plaintiffs must establish jurisdiction
without discovery,54 although that is not, in fact, the general rule. This
faulty hypothetical, however, appears to have been the foundation for
the court's invocation of "fairness" in rejecting post-removal discovery.55
The court also characterized post-removal discovery as "fishing
expeditions [that] would clog the federal judicial machinery."56 This
and other similar rhetoric suggests a frustration with current removal
practice and is possibly a reaction to CAFA's expansion of a defendant's
removal rights. Faced with the untidy fact that the district judge

51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 1218.
53. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
54. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1216.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 1217.
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himself asked for the plaintiffs in Lowery to confirm certain jurisdictional facts, the Eleventh Circuit went so far as to bar a district court from
conducting this discovery "on its own initiative." 7 Tacitly acknowledging the awkwardness of this direction, the court added a footnote to
clarify that "questioning a plaintiff's counsel in open court about the
value of the plaintiff's claims" was still permissible, with no explanation
of any principle distinguishing permissible questions about jurisdictional
facts from impermissible judicial discovery into them."8 If the facts are
relevant to an issue before the court, then either option should be at the
court's disposal.
Although the court's interpretations of CAFA in Lowery are themselves
noncontroversial, the court's foray into general removal procedure
wanders far from the mainstream. The court's refusal to permit any
jurisdictional discovery and its four-corners-of-the-pleadings approach
are an unwelcome relapse into legal formalism.5 9 Petitions for rehearing en banc and for certiorari, however, were denied.6"

II.

CLASS ACTION WAIVERS; ARBITRATION

The Eleventh Circuit signaled a shift in direction in evaluating the
enforceability of consumer arbitration provisions in Dale v. Comcast
Corp.6 In Dale the court refused to enforce an arbitration provision
that the cable television provider had included in the "Policies and
Procedures" it gave to each subscriber.62 The arbitration provision
contained a class action waiver and a clause providing that invalid
provisions could not be severed.'
The subscribers asserted a claim
under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 19846' concerning
franchise fees. Comcast sought to enforce the arbitration provision. The

57. Id. at 1221.
58. Id. at 1218 n.75.
59. Id. at 1215-16. Judge Acker-the district judge who issued the remand order in
Lowery-has since opined "that the day of the knee-jerk removal of diversity tort cases
from state to federal court within the three states comprising the Eleventh Circuit came
to an end on April 11, 2007," when Lowery was decided. Constant v. Int'l House of
Pancakes, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1308-09 (N.D. Ala. 2007). "Knee-jerk" or not,
removals based on diversity jurisdiction are likely to be more difficult after Lowery.
60. Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., No. 06-16324-CC, 06-16325-CC, 2008 WL 41327
(11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008), petition for cert. denied, No. 07-1246 (U.S. June 2, 2008).
61. 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007). The opinion was authored by Judge Susan H. Black
and joined by Judge Joel F. Dubina and a visiting judge, Judge Jane A. Restani, from the
United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. See id. at 1216 & n.*.
62. Id. at 1224.
63.

Id. at 1218, 1219 n.3.

64. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2279 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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subscribers argued that the class action waiver was unenforceable under
applicable Georgia law.65 Comcast relied on the Eleventh Circuit's
prior decision in Caley v. Gul/stream Aerospace Corp.,66 which rejected
a claim that a class action waiver was unconscionable under Georgia
The court noted that the holding in Caley was limited to the
law."
facts of that case. 8 The court distinguished Caley as well as two other
cases in which it had appeared to categorically reject objections to the
enforcement of consumer arbitration provisions. 69 The court recognized
two important differences between those cases and the case before it. ' °
First, in Dale "a remedy was effectively foreclosed because of the
negligible amount of recovery when compared to the cost of bringing an
arbitration action."71 Second, and more importantly, a review of the
claims in Caley and the other two cases showed that each provided for
the recovery of attorney fees, expert costs, or both should the plaintiff
prevail.72 The court concluded that the potential recovery of attorney
fees and litigation costs in certain circumstances under a Georgia statute
to be insufficient because the statute "does not provide the same
incentive for an attorney to represent an individual plaintiff as the
automatic, or likely, award of fees and costs available to a prevailing
plaintiff."73 In further support of its decision, the court cited a First
Circuit case that held a similar Comcast arbitration provision barring
class arbitration to be unenforceable. 4
The court closed with the admonition that "[c]orporations should not
be permitted to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate
themselves from liability for small-value claims."75 The court concluded
that "the enforceability of a particular class action waiver ... must be
determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the facts
While the court appeared in prior decisions to
and circumstances."7

65. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1218.
66. 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 1377-79. For a discussion, see Thomas M. Byrne, Class Actions, 57 MERCER
L. REV. 1031, 1034-36 (2006).
68. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1221.
69. See id. at 1221-22 (citing Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d
868, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2005); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 819
(11th Cir. 2001)).
70. See id. at 1221-22.
71. Id. at 1221.
72. Id. at 1221-22.
73. Id. at 1223 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2007)).
74. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st
Cir. 2006)).
75. Id. at 1224.
76. Id.
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give carte blanche endorsement to the enforceability of class action
waivers in arbitration provisions, the decision in Dale signifies an
unquestionable shift in the degree of scrutiny for these waivers.
III.

CLASS NOTICE

In Adams v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.,7 the court
considered what due process requires for a class notice to bind absent
class members to a settlement."v The appeal was brought by a group
of Mississippi state court plaintiffs who had been enjoined by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia from prosecuting
claims against an insurance company that the district court concluded
were released by a prior class settlement and thus barred by res
judicata.79 In 1999 the district court had approved the class settlement
of the original claims, which were based on allegedly fraudulent and
deceptive conduct concerning the marketing and sale of flexible premium
and universal life insurance policies. In 2005 the appellants filed two
separate actions against the insurance company in Mississippi state
court. The insurance company, relying on subsection (a) of the All Writs
Act, ° responded by filing a motion to enforce the district court's prior
class action judgment by permanently enjoining the appellants from
prosecuting the state court cases. The insurance company contended
that the present claims were nearly identical to the claims that had been
settled and released in the class action. The district court agreed and
enjoined the prosecution of the claim.8"
On appeal, the appellants contended that the class action notice
afforded to them was constitutionally defective. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected that claim, concluding that the forty-eight page notice in the
class action was thorough, clear, and comprehensible. 3 Moreover, the
insurance company published the notice in a national newspaper,
distributed the notice via multiple first class mailings, and provided a
toll-free telephone number, a website, and a mailing address to field
queries from class members.84 These actions constituted the best notice

77. 493 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). The opinion was authored by Judge Stanley F.
Birch, Jr. and was joined by Circuit Judges J.L. Edmondson and Charles R. Wilson. See
id. at 1278.
78. See id. at 1285-89.
79. Id. at 1278.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
81. Adams, 493 F.3d at 1282-85.
82. Id. at 1285.
83. Id. at 1287.
84. Id.
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practicable under the circumstances, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c). 8' The court held that the notice was broad enough to
encompass the appellants' "increasing premium" claims, even though
that phrase was not used in the notice. 8 The court also rejected the
appellants' related argument that their claims were not covered by the
class release. 7 The court specifically concluded that the two claims
implicated identical policies and that the release also covered causes of
action "that have been, could have been, ...

or could be alleged or

asserted now or in the future."8 8
The court's decision is a useful primer on the requirements for the
contents of class settlement notices. In particular, the court approved
the "Q & A" format for class notices that is favored by many class
settlement administrators, particularly following the 2003 amendment
to Rule 23(c) requiring that the class notice be presented "clearly and
concisely ...

in plain, easily understood language.""9

IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION APPEALS

In Jenkins v.BellSouth Corp.,90 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether a district court is empowered to revive a lapsed right to seek an
interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)" by
vacating a class certification order and reentering it. 92 As Judge Pryor

colorfully put it in his opinion for the court, "[t]he question in this
putative class action is whether a district court is empowered to sponsor
a revival of a right to seek an interlocutory appeal of its decision about
class certification as frequently and spontaneously as an evangelical
preacher leads a revival for a congregation," 9 a question that seemed
to prophesy the court's negative answer. The case was a race discrimination action by BellSouth employees. The district court entered an
order denying class certification, and the employees filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. The employees subsequently
filed a Rule 23(f) petition for permission to appeal the order, but they did
so after the ten-day period that the rule provides for such petitions.9 4

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
Adams, 493 F.3d at 1290, 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1290-91.
Id. at 1290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1286, 1291; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
491 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(M.
Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1289.
Id.
Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Federal Rule 23(M provides that
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Thus, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition as untimely.9 5 The
employees then moved the district court to vacate and reenter its order
denying the employees' motion to reconsider, citing excusable neglect
caused by an alleged mistake made by a courier service. The court
granted the motion and reentered the order. The employees subsequent96
ly filed a second Rule 23(f) petition.
In dismissing the second petition, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
ten-day window under Rule 23(f) "closes quickly to promote judicial
economy."97 The employees pointed to the general statutory process for
interlocutory appeals in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)9" and argued that the
district court had the authority to renew their opportunity to appeal
after the original deadline had expired. 99 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
that argument, noting that Rule 23(f) differs from § 1292(b) in two
significant ways. 100
First, unlike § 1292(b), Rule 23(f) "'does not
require that the district court certify the [class] certification ruling for
appeal,"' because under Rule 23(f), only the court of appeals makes that
call.'
Second, while § 1292(b) prescribes limited criteria for interlocutory appeals, Rule 23(f) does not. 10 2 The court also noted that the
Seventh Circuit has held that appellants may not use § 1292(b) to
circumvent the ten-day deadline in Rule 23(f).10 3 The court also cited
other circuits that have held that a district court has no authority to
grant an extension of time under Rule 23(f)' °4 and that a late or
successive motion to reconsider does not revive the ten-day deadline.'
The court concluded that Rule 23(f) provides a single opportunity for

[a] court of appeals may [in its discretion] permit an appeal from an order [of a
district court] granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a
petition for permission to appeal is filed ... within 10 days after the order is
entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
95. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1289 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f)).
96. Id. at 1289-90.
97. Id. at 1290 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
99. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1290.
100. Id. at 1291.
101. Id. (quoting FED, R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note).
102. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0).
103. Id. (citing Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v. Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc., 202 F.3d 957, 959
(7th Cir. 2000)).
104. Id. (citing Delta Airlines v. Butler, 383 F.3d 1143, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004)).
105. Id. (citing McNamara v. Felderhof, 410 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 2005); Gary v.
Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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parties to seek interlocutory review.106
In consolation, the court
offered that the employees still had another opportunity to seek review
after final judgment. °7 For most who suffer an adverse class certification ruling but miss the interlocutory appeal deadline, that consolation
is small indeed.' 0 8
V.

CERTIFICATION VS. MERITS ISSUES

The year also afforded the court an opportunity to write another
chapter in its Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp.'0 9 saga, involving a
would-be class action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974 ("RESPA"). 110 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a
mortgage lender, had acted illegally by paying yield spread premiums to
its mortgage brokers."' Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the
112
yield spread premium payments violated section 8(a) of RESPA,
which prohibits the payment of "any fee, kickback, or thing of value
pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that
business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service
involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any
person.""' 3 In Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp. (Culpepper I),"'
the Eleventh Circuit held that the yield spread premium payment in the
plaintiffs' case violated RESPA as an illegal referral fee." 5 The court
rejected the argument that the fee was bona fide compensation for a

106.

Id. at 1292.

107. Id.
108. Also pertinent to class action appellate procedure was Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna
U.S. Healthcare,Inc., 475 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2007), in which the court held that mere
filing of a notice of appeal was not sufficient to properly perfect a Federal Rule 23(f) appeal
of an order remanding a case that was removed under CAFA. Id. at 1230. The court found
that Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, FED. R. APP. P. 5, governed
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), so that a petition for permission to appeal must be
filed with the circuit court within the time specified in the statute. Main Drug, Inc., 475
F.3d at 1230. The opinion was authored by Judge Ed Carnes and joined by Judge William
H. Pryor, Jr., and Judge Jerome Farris from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. See id. at 1229.
109. The Culpepper line of cases is as follows: Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp.
(Culpepper V), 491 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp.
(Culpepper III), 253 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2001); Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.
(Culpepper I/), 144 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 1998); Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.
(Culpepper 1), 132 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998).
110. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
111. Culpepper IV, 491 F.3d at 1262.
112. Id.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
114. 132 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 697.
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service performed by the broker that would exempt it from liability. 116
The court also vacated the district court's denial of class certification.117 In Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp. (Culpepper II),11s the
court clarified its ruling in Culpepper I as not establishing liability
conclusively and held that the district court had acted prematurely in
granting summary judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff.'19 In
Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp. (Culpepper II1),12° the issue was
whether the district court, on remand, had erred in certifying a class
action. To decide the class certification issue, the court accepted the
parties' contention that it could determine whether class certification
was appropriate only if it settled the liability rule under RESPA, which
had been called into question by an intervening statement of policy'121
22
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").
After clarifying the liability question, the court affirmed class certification.12 In the wake of Culpepper III, HUD issued a second statement
of policy, 124 disagreeing with the standard of liability set forth in
Culpepper 111.125
Subsequently, in Heimmermann v. First Union
Mortgage Corp.,126 the court held that the clarified HUD interpretation
was entitled to judicial deference and overruled Culpepper 111.127 The
court in Heimmermann held that the HUD standard of liability also
precluded class certification because it was necessary to determine
whether compensable services were provided by the broker and whether
the total amount of broker compensation was reasonable in light of the
circumstances of each loan. 2 s
In Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp. (Culpepper !V)," 2 9 the district
court had granted the mortgage company's motion to decertify the

116. Id.
117. Id. at 698.
118. 144 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 718-19.
120. 253 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2001).

121. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Statement of Policy 1999-1
Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10080 (1999).
122. Culpepper III, 253 F.3d at 1327-29.
123. Id. at 1332.
124. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2000-1: Clarification
of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and
Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53052 (2001).
125. See Culpepper IV, 491 F.3d at 1267.
126. 305 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2002).
127. Id. at 1264.
128.
129.

Id.
491 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
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class. 3 ' After rejecting a contention that its ruling in Culpepper III
was not the law of the case (and therefore did not bind the court to the
earlier liability standard), the court affirmed summary judgment in favor
of the mortgage company.'
On the class certification issue, the court
noted that the standard of review in decertification cases is abuse of
discretion.12 The court concluded that in light of HUD's statement of
policy and the court's decision in Heimmermann,an individualized, caseby-case assessment is required, making class certification inappropriate
for section 8 RESPA claims.'33 The court observed that this holding
was in line with other circuits and also held that there was no abuse of
discretion.3 4
The Culpepper quartet is notable because the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that it was necessary to determine an important question on
the merits of the case before making a decision about a class certification. Exactly when a district court may make a merits determination
regarding class certification remains controversial."' Culpepper is the
best example within the Eleventh Circuit of why it is necessary for the
district court to determine the standard of liability before deciding
whether to grant or deny class certification.
VI.

COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

In three cases, the court turned to the requirements for a "collective"
action,".6 a species of class action permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") 137 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.13' A collective action differs from an ordinary class
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 231" in that each class
member must decide, after being notified of the action, whether or not
to "opt-in." 4 ° In an ordinary class action, the absent class members,

130. Id. at 1274-75.
131. Id. at 1274, 1275 n.8.
132. Id. at 1275.
133. Id. at 1276.
134. Id. at 1276-77. In early 2008, the court returned to RESPA class actions in Busby
v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
135. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); Szabo
v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
136. See Albritton v. Cagle's, Inc., 508 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2007); De Leon-Granados
v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488
F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
140. Anderson, 488 F.3d at 950 n.3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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after receiving notice, must affirmatively exclude themselves, or "optout," to not be bound by the class judgment. 141 The effect of the
difference is to reduce the size of collective actions because, for
a variety
142
of reasons, many eligible class members elect not to opt-in.
In the first case, Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc.,143 the plaintiffs appealed
the district court's order decertifying their collective action under the
FLSA. The cause of action was a so-called "donning and doffing" claim
under the FLSA. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that they had not

received compensation due to them for the time they spent donning and
doffing protective clothing. Although the district court initially certified
the collective action and facilitated the notice to would-be opt-in
plaintiffs, the district court ultimately granted the defendants' motion
to decertify the collective action.144 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the district court had properly followed its prior decision
in Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,"' which set forth the

two-stage procedure for determining whether a collective action could be
certified.14 6 In the "'fairly lenient'" first stage, the district court
decides certification based primarily on pleadings and affidavits. 147 In
the second stage, which the court in Anderson noted is "'typically
precipitated by a [defendant's] motion for decertification. . . usually filed
after discovery ... the court has much more information on which to
base its decision, and makes a factual determination on the similarly
situated question. "' 148 Relying heavily on the abuse of discretion
standard of review, the court in Anderson concluded that the district
court's view of the evidence was reasonable, and its findings were not
clearly erroneous. " 9 The district court decertifed the class because the
named plaintiffs could not "fairly and adequately represent the variously
assigned employees, the wide variety of work assignments and varied
compensation structures affecting the purported class. " "O
141. Id.
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
143. 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007). The opinion was authored by Judge Joel F. Dubina,
joined by Judge Emmett R. Cox and District Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger from the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. See id. at
948-49, 948 n*.
144. Id. at 949-50.
145. 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001).
146. See Anderson, 488 F.3d at 952-53 (citing Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218). The court also
cited Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996).
147. Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207,
1214 (5th Cir. 1995)).
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214).
149. Id. at 954.
150. Id. at 952 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In a second, related case, Albritton v. Cagle's, Inc.,' the issue before
the court was whether the opt-in notices received by the plaintiffs in
Anderson (notices received before the action was decertified) provided
sufficient authorization to initiate a new lawsuit on behalf of the opt-in
parties, who were permissively joined under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 20(a). 152 The district court granted the employer's motion
to dismiss, finding that the opt-in form specifically provided that the
unnamed plaintiffs elected to opt-in to the first lawsuit but did not
authorize any new or additional suits to be brought in their names.5 8
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. 54 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' attorneys' argument that they sent follow-up
letters to the unnamed plaintiffs, giving the unnamed plaintiffs an
opportunity to affirmatively opt-out of the two lawsuits.'5 5 According
to the court, "The problem with that argument, of course, is that § 216(b)
requires that would-be plaintiffs affirmatively opt in, and that they do
so in writing, and that the
writing be filed in court before they can be
15 6
included in the lawsuit.

In the third collective action case, De Leon-Granadosv.Eller & Sons
Thees, Inc.,"' the defendant employers appealed the district court's
grant of class certification. The plaintiffs were employees who claimed
that their employers had violated their rights under the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act

FLSA.159

58

("AWPA") and the

The class certified by the district court consisted of more
than 1500 migrant workers admitted into the United States under the
H-2B temporary foreign worker visa program. 6 ' The Eleventh Circuit
accepted the employers' interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f).16 ' The employers' lead argument on appeal was that

the action was based on the FLSA and therefore had to be adjudicated
as an opt-in collective action, rather than as an opt-out Rule 23(b)(3)

151. 508 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2007).
152. Id. at 1014; FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
153. Albritton, 508 F.3d at 1016.
154. Id. at 1019.
155. Id. at 1017.
156. Id.
157. 497 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2007). The opinion was authored by Judge Susan H.
Black and joined by Judges Joel F. Dubina and a visiting judge from the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. See id. at 1216, 1216 n.*.
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
160. De Leon-Granados,497 F.3d at 1216.
161. Id. at 1218 n.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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class action." 2 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the AWPA and
FLSA claims both sought unpaid wages but were not identical.6 3 The
workers' AWPA claims thus were not "FLSA claims in disguise" and
could properly be brought in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.'6 4 The court
noted that the workers had other AWPA claims that did not concern
unpaid wages and that these claims were also appropriate for Rule 23
certification.'6 5
The employers alternatively argued that even if Rule 23 class
certification was permissible, the court abused its discretion in certifying
the class. Specifically, the employers challenged the adequacy of the
class's representation by the named plaintiffs on the grounds that they
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights during their depositions when
asked if they worked for other employers in the United States.'6 6 The
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the district court acknowledged a
potential adequacy of representation problem in view of the privilege
claims but decided to revisit the issue after its relevance was resolved. 6 7
The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the district court's
commitment to reexamine the issue and concluded there was no abuse
of discretion in finding adequate representation. 168 The employers also
argued that a highly individualized assessment of facts would be
necessary to determine the amount of hours each employee worked
compared with the amount recorded.'6 9 The court termed this a "valid
concern" but again found no abuse of discretion, noting that the AWPA
permits workers to recover either actual or statutory damages, so that
"it is within the district court's discretion to award statutory damages
where proof of actual damages is scarce." 7 ° According to the court, the
availability of statutory damages eliminates the need to determine
individualized damages based on actual hours worked.' 71

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

De Leon-Granados,497 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.
Id.

